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Abstract 
The Torit Mutiny of August 1955 in southern Sudan did not trigger a civil war, but 
state violence and disorder escalated over the following years. We explore how 
the outlook and strategies of the government officials who inherited the state 
apparatus of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium contributed to this development. 
They perpetuated authoritarian and violent government practises based on a 
legalistic distinction between citizen and outlaw, while justifying their actions as 
part of a developmentalist and nationalistic discourse. The Mutiny created fear of 
another outbreak of violence which prompted recourse to collective punishment, 
an expanded intelligence network and bolstered the powers and mandate of the 
chiefs. However, the authoritarian tendencies were paired with developmentalism 
and the desire to educate and civilise the southerners. Through education and the 
justice and penal system they were to be ‘made to learn’ how to become ‘modern’. 
This combination of perpetuating colonial government practises and fervent 
nationalism resonates with analyses of transitions to independence elsewhere in 
Africa, from which the case of southern Sudan has been largely excluded up to 
now. 
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In August 1955, less than six months before Sudan’s declaration of independence, the 
newly ‘Sudanised’ administration faced a violent uprising in the southernmost province of 
Equatoria. Over a two week period, 261 northern Sudanese men, women and children were 
killed by southern soldiers, police and prison officers and others who joined in the violence 
and looting. Many southerners fled the towns, including 55 who drowned trying to cross a 
river near Torit. Northern troops arrived in force towards the end of August and arrested a 
large share of the mutineers and many civilians; some fled to Uganda and Congo and only 
some few mutineers stayed in ‘the bush’ in the eastern parts of Equatoria and the Sudan-
Uganda borderlands. The Khartoum government response was restrained, but not lenient: 
perhaps as many as 1,000 were imprisoned and at least 121 death sentences were carried out.
1
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This violent episode – known at the time as the ‘Southern disturbances’, and more commonly 
now as the ‘Torit Mutiny’ – has come to be regarded as a crucial moment in Sudan’s 
transition to independence in 1956. It is commemorated by many South Sudanese as the 
beginning of the ‘struggle’ against northern dominance. Scholars too have viewed the events 
of 1955 in hindsight as ‘a fateful omen for the beginning of a half-century of bloody, 
unrelenting civil war’.2 The Torit Mutiny is thus understood as a rupture, separating the 
relative stability of the Pax Brittanica from an increasingly violent and repressive post-
colonial southern Sudan.  
 
The Mutiny – as the perceived start of the civil war – has therefore been subsumed 
into broader analyses of the causes of conflict. In a polarised national historiography, 
northern Sudanese scholars attribute the first civil war to the harmful, divisive effects of the 
British colonial ‘Southern Policy’, while southern scholarship has criticised colonial neglect 
for leaving southerners vulnerable to the political and military domination of northerners.
3
 
But recent research has demonstrated that only from 1963 can conflict between the 
government and southern rebel forces be termed civil war, making not just the 1955 Mutiny 
but the period after it crucial to understanding the causes of war.
4
 Historians have only 
cursorily recounted the post-independent repression by the new Sudanese administrators in 
the south, and attempts to impose national unity through campaigns of Arabicisation and 
Islamicisation, including the eventual expulsion of Christian missionaries in 1964.
5
 But this 
narrative of a sudden shift in policy and administrative practices both underestimates the 
inherent violence of the colonial state, and wrongly assumes that its successors had altogether 
different agendas. Instead of revolution, the nationalists only sought control over the existing 
government institutions and instruments to rule the people of Sudan.
6
  
 
This article thus argues for a much greater degree of continuity in the use of state 
violence from the colonial to the postcolonial period. Newly available archival material from 
the 1950s demonstrates considerable concern among these Sudanese administrators to justify 
coercive methods and policies in ways that are strikingly similar to colonial discourse.
7
 This 
is particularly evident in their emphasis on legalism and developmentalism – the two main 
strands of government discourse to be explored here. The methods of administration followed 
by the new Sudanese officials were similar to those of their predecessors, relying on chiefs at 
the centre of colonial ‘Native Administration’ to be the agents of state development, justice 
and security. The Mutiny undoubtedly provoked insecurity and paranoia among northern 
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Sudanese officials in the south, but the violence of August 1955 – and the threat of its 
recurrence – also fed the elaborate discourse of legalism, state sovereignty and citizenship, 
through which the duties of state and subjects were being defined in the late colonial and 
early postcolonial period. We can therefore trace significant continuities in the government 
administrators’ perception of South Sudan and its people, and in the methods and principles 
by which they were to be ruled. In the Sudanese administrative language of law and order, 
and public security, the southerners were to be ‘developed’, ‘modernised’ and ‘civilised’.  
 
We will thus explore the continuities of governance in southern Sudan in the period 
1954-60, to argue for its integration into the wider literature on the transition to 
independence. First we examine the outlook of the new northern Sudanese administrators 
immediately after they took up their posts in South Sudan in the period from mid-1954 to 
early August 1955. This was a period marked by optimism on behalf of the state’s capacity to 
positively transform societies in southern Sudan and to integrate the southerners into a larger 
national endeavour of modernisation, which we locate in the broader literature on African 
nationalist projects. Then we demonstrate how the violence of late August 1955 accentuated 
the more authoritarian aspects of this agenda: the southern Sudanese needed to be controlled 
and taught to behave as good citizens. Finally, we explore the ways in which northern 
Sudanese administrators justified state violence and coercion in the languages of legalism and 
developmentalism.  
 
 
Colonial inheritances: legalism and developmentalism 
The origin of authoritarian developmentalism and a legalistic approach to governance 
in Sudan was rooted in a general ambition among government officials to render ‘legible’ the 
societies they intended to dominate, by seeking to map, standardize and structure society so 
that it could be easily measured, monitored and regulated for the purpose of control and 
extraction of resources.
8
 Such efforts were not restricted to the late colonial period, but had 
been integral to British imperialism since the late eighteenth century.
9
 In the interwar period, 
the ideologies of indirect rule in Britain’s African colonies further encouraged the mapping 
and ordering of colonial society according to tribes and chiefs, introducing uniform 
hierarchies of chiefs’ courts with regularised powers and limitations. 10  Law and legal 
procedures were thus key tools in the quest for legibility. The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
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Government’s primary interwar development project, the Gezira cotton-growing scheme in 
northern Sudan, also entailed control and ordering of its tenant farmer inhabitants. 11 Thus, 
state visions of development both required and furthered knowledge and control of Sudanese 
society. 
 
By the 1940s, however, administrators’ amateur ethnographic reporting and the 
conservative goals of the indirect rule era were being replaced by technocratic expertise, 
centralised planning and increasingly ambitious development goals. The decades after the 
Second World War were the heyday of government planning: belief in the transformatory 
potential of technical and scientific knowledge, together with the growing international 
pressure to confer the benefits of modernity upon the colonised, resulted in a model of 
development in the colonies that was ‘profoundly state-centric’.12 Arguably, this ideology had 
a particularly strong hold on the mind of government leaders and officials in Africa, both 
before and after independence. Even in southern Sudan, where British administrative policy 
remained largely conservative and cautious, the ambitions of late colonial development are 
evident in the creation of the Zande cotton-growing Scheme. Like the Gezira Scheme, though 
on a smaller scale, the Zande Scheme aimed at social engineering and resettlement as well as 
economic development.13 
 
 The educated elite of northern Sudanese who inherited the government of the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium shared the modernising zeal and developmentalist agenda of the 
period. But this was combined with a distinctive sense of cultural superiority based on their 
own identification with Arabness and Islam. Heather Sharkey’s study of the nationalist 
movement among the Sudanese ‘modern’ elite of secondary school graduates demonstrates 
how Arab nationalism and the British colonial mind-set converged within this social 
segment.
14
 Education combined with Islam, Arabic language and lineage were seen as the 
explanation for their ascension to power, but at the same time also as the basis for a uniform 
national identity.  
 
The Sudanese understanding of citizenship at this time was permeated by legal 
language and a fetishisation of the law which resonates with a more general trend in colonial 
Africa, where the language of the law was used to ‘authorize predation and criminalize 
opposition’.15 This tendency was inherited by the postcolonial state, and the citizen was, as 
Comaroff and Comaroff argue, primarily defined as ‘legal subject’.16 Scholars have argued 
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that the rhetoric of nation-building and development justified the continuation of 
exclusionary and coercive government after the independence of African states.
17
 Citing 
Mbembe, Young stresses that legalism was central to this programme:  
 
With a disposition to violence and a propensity to arbitrary discipline of the subject 
reminiscent of the indigénat, the state, committed to a vocation of ‘modernizing the 
nation and civilizing the society’, inflated notions of subversion and ‘threats to state 
security’ to facilitate punishment of the dissident ‘with the judicial formalism 
characteristic of authoritarian regimes’.18 
 
Legalism and developmentalism were intertwined in this authoritarian vision of 
modernization. In the French colonial indigénat in West Africa, colonial governments had 
long cited a lack of advancement among the populations they governed as justification for 
colonial coercion and collective punishment.
19
 After decolonisation, postcolonial state 
violence was ‘frequently (and paradoxically) designed to force participation in new political 
communities dubbed republics, which were grounded at least rhetorically in emerging 
principles of citizenship and equality’. 20  Thus, developmentalism was used to justify 
coercion: participation and compulsion were not antithetical in nationalist and government 
discourse.  
 
Starting ahead of the first wave of independence, the decolonisation process of the 
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government foreshadowed developments elsewhere in Africa. 
Government officials in Sudan saw themselves as engaged in the education of southerners in 
the meaning and duties of citizenship. For the early nationalists there was no conflict between 
a modernising, civilising and nation-building effort in Sudan, and the desire to spread Islam 
and the Arabic language; rather, these were seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing 
goals. This should not however discount individual agency and idiosyncrasies. Like the 
British administrators before them, there was a considerable variation in zeal and capacity 
among the northern officials, and differences in their ability and interest in communicating 
across the cultural chasm that separated them from the southerners. During this period we 
also find some southerners in subordinate government positions at the district and province 
level. Although most of these southerners increasingly favoured federalism or autonomy for 
the south, in their daily execution of administrative responsibilities they adhered to the 
northerners’ governance agenda and perceptions of southern Sudanese society.  
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Developing southern Sudan, 1954-55 
The northern Sudanese who inherited the Sudanese government in the mid-1950s 
regarded the mission to modernise and assimilate southern Sudan into the national polity as 
imperative. The south was to the northern nationalists the prime example of colonial misrule 
and divisive politics. They claimed they would reverse the marginalisation of the south 
resulting from British administrative neglect, yet the new rulers adopted and perpetuated the 
development agenda of their predecessors, alongside a strong belief in the power of modern 
governance and its ultimate capacity to transform society. The official mind in the first year 
of Sudanisation is revealed in a collection of annual reports from the districts of Equatoria 
Province, mostly written in June 1955 – only weeks before the Torit Mutiny. 21  The 
developmentalist outlook is clearly visible in this report from Torit: 
 
[N]o serious attempt was ever made to develop this District economically, 
educationally, socially etc. ... In fact the forty years, which have now lapsed since the 
Sudan Government took over this District, have not changed the plain Lotuho in the 
least. They still lead the pastoral life [of] their forefathers and they are still undressed, 
uneducated and as backward as they were found by the British [in] 1914. The British 
hypothesis that these people are happy as they are is a fallacy which served as a ready 
answer to any visitor who asked why these people were still in such a primitive 
condition. It is high time for them to know or to be made to know that they, in their 
present state, belong to a stage of civilization which disappeared hundreds of years 
ago and that unless they adapt themselves to the prevailing stage the complexities of 
the modern world will inevitably shatter their tribal life and destroy their obsolete 
tradition against their will.22  
 
Even before the violence of August 1955, then, Sudanese administrators asserted that 
southerners must be ‘made to know’ that modernisation was inevitable. Such coercive 
rhetoric and policy would become even stronger after 1955. The perceived reason for 
southern Sudan’s lack of development was that the British had held the people back and 
hindered northerners’ access to the area from 1924 to 1946.23 Nakedness and ‘indecency’ 
were seen to epitomise southern backwardness, to be stamped out for the ‘good prestige of 
the Sudanese nation’.24  
 
Yet despite their criticism of Condominium policies and practises, the new Sudanese 
administrators retained many of the methods and ideas of their colonial predecessors. The 
District Commissioner (DC) was still the man-on-the-spot who had full command of the 
government’s meagre resources at the local level, and who was expected to get to know ‘his 
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people’ to overcome the illegibility of society. Above all, these administrators were to ensure 
the preservation of law and order in their districts, as the Governor of Equatoria, Abdel Aziz 
Omer el Amin, made clear to a meeting of the new northern DCs in Juba in February 1955:  
 
As officials we are responsible to see that the constitution is observed and Law and 
Order are maintained. In this connection all citizens must have equal rights and 
obligations irrespective of their nationality, tribe, religion or any other differences. A 
mixture of sympathy and firmness should be the basis of the Administration. The 
Governor then made a special emphasis on as much trekking as possible and on 
learning the local dialects as the best means for knowing the local people and gaining 
their confidence.25 
 
Noting the ‘delicate’ political atmosphere in Equatoria, the meeting further expressed concern 
that northern Sudanese traders had not previously been subject to the jurisdiction of chiefs’ 
courts, and that some of them might have contributed to the ‘ill feeling’ in the province: 
‘They have to be made to appreciate that all people are equal before the law and that they are 
expected to set a good example and play their role in the betterment of the present 
atmosphere’. The chiefs’ courts were to be further supported through a building programme: 
‘For the prestige and respect of Native Courts, it is of great importance to build as decent 
court houses as possible’.26 
 
As this suggests, the new administrators were committed to the system of chiefs, 
seeing them as the most reliable interlocutors between government and people. Like the 
colonial government, the Sudanese officials depicted the ‘ordinary’ people as innocent in 
their ignorance, needing protection from the corrupting influence of educated ‘detribalised’ 
politicians. At the end of 1955, the same Governor of Equatoria, El Amin, would reiterate the 
innocence of the ‘Ordinary Citizen’:  
 
By this is meant the man in the bush who has no special political ideas, and who is not 
interested – or may not even know, what is going on. He must therefore be protected 
well from any harmful influence. Every effort must be made to gain such man [sic].
27
  
 
Reflecting the old contradictions of colonial policies, the new administration was thus both 
determined to bring development and modernity to the southern provinces, and to protect and 
conserve traditional authority and society: the DCs’ meeting in early 1955 vehemently 
refuted a central government abolition of cattle fines on the grounds that it would ‘disrupt 
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their social fabric’, ‘break down the back bone of the customary law and consequently have a 
very serious effect on the public security’.28 
 
During these months before the Torit Mutiny, security problems were not perceived 
as challenging the state’s authority, but rather were dismissed in a condescending and 
paternalistic manner, harking back to the British days. The Torit annual report thus explains 
the rise in crime within the district: 
 
The newly enfranchised generation naturally wish [sic] to prove that they are equal to 
the responsibility put over them and that they can do manly acts of homicide, arson 
and grievous hurt. Hence the increase in major court cases.29 
 
The new administrators were much less indulgent, however, when it came to attempts by 
southern politicians and Egyptians to promote alternative political agendas for southern 
Sudan. Southern political opposition was largely limited to the towns, especially Juba, which 
was then the administrative headquarters of Equatoria. 30  A conference was held 18-21 
October 1954 and southern parliamentarians organised a follow-up meeting 3-6 July 1955.
31
 
A number of chiefs attended the 1954 conference, but it appears that they all abstained in 
1955. In Equatoria, following a hint from a central government source, ‘politically minded’ 
administrators arranged for telegrams expressing support for Sudanese unity to be sent from 
the chiefs of the different districts, the Zande case being particularly controversial and adding 
to the general tension in the south in the months before the Mutiny.
32
 A similar incident took 
place in the Eastern District: 
 
In a big meeting held in June in the Toposa B/Court house at Kapoeta, attended by 
chiefs, sub-chiefs, merchants and leading tribesmen of Topsa, Didinga and Boya, the 
ideas of Unity with Egypt and separation of the South were unanimously rejected. All 
those present made it quite clear to their members in the house of Representatives that 
they will accept nothing short of a united fully independent Sudan.
33
  
 
During the months of May-August, tension increased in southern Sudan. There was a 
demonstration when the British Governor-General, Sir Knox-Helm, visited in May 1955: 
‘various slogans which in essence, conveyed the creed of hostility to the northerners were 
displayed in various ways. Legal proceedings had been taken against those who attempted to 
create enmity between classes.’ 34  This recourse to legal instruments to control political 
activity would be reinforced in the aftermath of the violence that erupted in August 1955. 
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The Torit Mutiny and the ‘outlaws’  
The Torit Mutiny would have a deep and lasting impact on relations between the 
southerners and their newly instated rulers. However, while these weeks of violence clearly 
heightened security concerns, we argue that the Mutiny served only to accentuate the existing 
discourse of legalism and the intertwining of development with security. For instance, reports 
on Rumbek District described the effects of the 1955 Mutiny in terms of a spate of criminal 
activity: ‘robberies and brigandage’. 35  Vengeance against the mutineers was delivered 
through the justice system, with trials quickly set up once the Mutiny was suppressed.
36
 There 
were several reasons why the Sudan government attempted to restrain the use of extra-
judicial violence in their initial response to the Mutiny. Most important was the need to 
demonstrate vis-à-vis Britain and Egypt that the government had the situation under control 
and did not need any ‘assistance’ from co-domini forces.37 It is also conceivable that the 
northern administration by using the courts to deal with the issue wished to demonstrate that 
they were ‘civilised’ and modern and thus refrained from ‘barbaric’ retaliation. Most 
importantly though, this resonates with the legalistic outlook of the new government where 
superiority and development was displayed through the control and mastery of legal 
instruments. This emphasis on legal codes when justifying emergency measures is also 
evident in a later statement by the Governor of Equatoria from 1956, Ali Baldo, when he 
wrote to DCs condemning the ill-treatment of prisoners and warning of the danger of 
alienating people and undermining confidence in government and justice. 38 Moreover, to 
combat rumours of abuses of southern prisoners in the north, the Province Council was 
informed that the prisoners were well taken care of and treated fairly.39 
 
Some of the mutineers escaped capture and remained ‘in the bush’, but by late 1956 
the security challenge posed by the mutineers in Equatoria was in reality minimal.
40
 One 
group in Eastern District was supposed to consist of only three mutineers operating in concert 
with Toposa ‘tribesmen’. Another group led by Lomiluk Lohide and Latada Hillir was a 
threat to government control in the area east of Torit. These two groups carried out a few 
ambushes. In one instance a group of cars carrying the DC and high ranking chiefs of the 
District were attacked on their way back from a meeting in Uganda. These attacks led to 
military operations where villages and crops were burned and cattle confiscated, but which 
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failed to effectuate the capture of the ‘outlaws’. During 1956 and 1957 other ‘outlaws’ were 
pursued in Eastern District and also in one case further north in the Pibor/Boma area; severe 
penalties were meted out to those that were found to assist them in any capacity. Although 
the impact of their operations were negligible, these groups were considered a challenge to 
the government’s control and prestige in southern Sudan; it was feared that if they were not 
dealt with swiftly and thoroughly they would be followed by others and the government 
control would crumble. In consequence, the ‘outlaws’ exercised a disproportionate influence 
on the official imagination in the years after the Mutiny, contributing to a preoccupation with 
security, law and order and loyalty to the state. 
 
The use of coercive force to control political demonstrations was deemed necessary to 
prevent ‘innocent’ citizens getting dragged into criminal activity.41 The above-mentioned acts 
of brutality perpetrated by southerners during the Torit Mutiny compelled administrators to 
believe that the southerners were potentially dangerous and it appears that northerners in 
southern Sudan felt more insecure subsequently, especially in Equatoria. In Torit the situation 
was normalising at a slow rate; as late as November 1956, Governor Ali Baldo reported that: 
 
The District Commissioner Torit has now moved from the house he used to occupy in 
the army cantonment to his proper house in the Town and so did his assistant. This 
has re-assured the local people and gave them confidence that the situation has 
returned to normal. On the other hand it has had its effect in raising the morale of the 
terror striken [sic] northern merchants in Torit.42 
 
Civil administrators in the district lived in the barracks more than a year after the 
Mutiny, indicating the high level of perceived insecurity. Arrests and prosecutions were 
widespread even in the Bahr el-Ghazal province, which had seen little violence during the 
Mutiny.43 Violence had escalated quickly during the first days of the Mutiny and to avoid this 
in the future it was assumed that swift and strict measures were necessary when new 
incidents occurred. The prioritisation of security lead to the creation and extension of an 
intelligence apparatus in the south: a meeting of provincial governors in 1956 ‘resolved that 
the District Commissioner should have a personal responsibility in operating and checking 
the Intelligence system in his district’.44  
 
The northern officials argued – much like their colonial predecessors – that only a 
firm display of justice and law enforcement would ensure that government authority was 
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upheld. Even in 1957, an intelligence report from Eastern District warned of the continuing 
dangers of not having caught and convicted the ‘outlaws’ from the mutiny:  
 
As a result of several raids that took place in the Eastern District between Toposa-
Boya in which some mutineers took part and which involved deaths on both parts and 
maiming and looting of cattle rumours started to spread amongst the simple tribesmen 
of failure of Government to trace and punish the offenders. This has been interpreted 
by the populace of the area as weakness on the part of the Government. Further 
rumours went as far as accusing the Government of releasing murderers at Juba and 
though they see the Government arrest murderers and try them yet they have not 
heard of any murderer being hanged and therefore they believe that such murderers 
who, after trial sent to Juba, are subsequently released.45 
 
Whether these ‘rumours’ had any root in actual sentiments among people in Eastern District 
is unclear, but officials were evidently convinced of the need to demonstrate ‘strong’ 
government through arrests and punishments. In November 1957, the same official reported 
on some successes: 
 
A fairly good deal of improvement in public security in Eastern District had prevailed 
after the recent mass arrests of outlaws and murderers and their deterrent punishments 
by state of Chiefs Special Courts. The wild and savage Toposa of Riwato, and Nikor 
and the notorious Boya of Thugurn and Longarim Hills have come to realize that 
there is a strong Government that came to stay and rule and keep peace order and give 
justice.46 
 
This assumed change of heart was wishful thinking, but the quote is evidence of the 
prevailing government view on peoples in the rural peripheries. The central role of chiefs in 
policing and security helped to maintain the government focus on justice – but equally 
fundamental was the belief that the demonstration of effective justice was vital to building 
confidence in government.  
 
Security became an explicit signifier of a state-society contract and the duties of 
citizenship: it was the duty of the state to protect its citizens, ‘and if mutineers are left at large 
they constitute a danger to citizens’; conversely it was also the duty of the citizens to 
contribute to security: ‘we need cooperation of the whole citizens for their own safety and 
security’.47 This contract had a long history: from the earliest days of colonial rule, British 
officers had promised state protection in return for loyalty and cooperation.
48
 Chiefs had been 
and remained central to the contract:  
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Good and loyal chiefs will be always rewarded while slack and bad ones will be 
severely punished... [S]ecurity ranks first and... chiefs are responsible to clear their 
areas from mutineers and their firearms so that government officials give them the 
best of their generosity and services.49  
 
These northern Sudanese officers were not simply asserting the coercive force of the state – 
though they did not veil this threat in addressing the chiefs – but were also emphasising quite 
explicitly the dependence of the state on its citizens for security, and vice versa.  
 
Despite the modernising rhetoric of Sudan’s administrators, the threat of violence 
made them even more committed to the system of Native Administration than their colonial 
predecessors had been.
50
 In the immediate aftermath of the Torit Mutiny, Equatoria Governor 
El Amin urged the need to win over the ‘ordinary citizens’ in the south and to establish 
‘friendly relations’: 
 
The best suggested means being personal contact and application of justice. Of course 
he needs to be convinced that his District Commissioner is here to serve him and 
NOT to rule him. All this must be done without belittling the Chief who has specific 
importance... Social contacts must be encouraged to bridge the gab [sic] between 
Northerners and Southerners...  
[Southern] Members of Parliament... have to observe the law and must in NO case be 
allowed to interfere with the administration.51 
 
One of the first acts of the government after the 1955 mutiny was to raise the pay of chiefs. 
Local Government Councils were at the same time pilloried for weakening ‘Chiefs in 
particular and administration in general’.52 Chiefly members of the province council who had 
fled to Uganda and Congo were replaced with ‘loyalists’. These chiefs were told that they 
were the ‘eye, ear and hand of government’.53 In 1957, the Sudan Government’s ministerial 
committee for the affairs of the south recommended the ‘warranting of wider administrative 
and legal powers’ to improve the status of chiefs and ‘to add to their prestige and influence’.54 
The judicial role of chiefs was stressed, and DCs were issuing orders about the proper 
recording of court cases by chiefs and other matters of procedure. The Chief Justice asked the 
Governors of the Southern Provinces to report on whether there was indeed a need to increase 
the ‘legal powers’ of chiefs, cautioning that this should only be done if it was ‘absolutely 
necessary for maintenance of public peace and order’, but agreeing that it was ‘a sound policy 
to increase the prestige of those Chiefs who administer local justice in their areas’. 55 
Moreover, in the name of security, state violence was outsourced to chiefs and their retainers: 
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It is evident... that there are still many mutineers on both sides of the river [Nile] and 
that their activity is on the increase every day. It is evident also that these mutineers 
are finding sympathy, help and shelter from the local people. Chiefs have failed to 
arrest them and we should not expect them to do so without arming their retainers as 
recommended in my Security Council Meeting in May.56 
 
But effective law enforcement and intelligence gathering was seen to depend upon ‘friendly 
relations’ with the population as well as on the loyalty of chiefs. Law and justice were thus 
both the means of winning over citizens and of protecting them from the dangerous influence 
of politicians.  
 
 
Forging the Sudanese nation: law and citizenship  
The government discourse of law and order was linked to the definition of citizenship 
and nationalism in southern Sudan. Seen from the Sudanese nationalist perspective, a citizen 
must accept the sovereignty of the new rulers: adherence to the project of creating a united 
Sudan was required. There was no sympathy for alternative agendas – in particular attempts 
to gain federal status for southern Sudan. Southern politicians were viewed as destabilising 
elements in the newly independent Sudan, assumed to be under the influence of Christian 
missionaries. Nationalist and even international dimensions of the Torit Mutiny were 
engendered by the assumed involvement of foreign missionaries and that fact that the 
mutineers who escaped to the Uganda Protectorate were given sanctuary and Ugandan 
colonial authorities refused to repatriate them to the Sudan – Sudan government reports even 
alleged that some of the mutineers were hired by the Ugandan government.57 This fuelled 
suspicions of British intentions towards the Sudan, and southern Sudan in particular. 
Eventually relations with Britain improved: by early 1957 the colonial government of Uganda 
was cooperating militarily with the Sudan in the search for mutineers in the border areas.58  
 
But suspicion continued to hang over the missionaries. The Sudan government 
decision to nationalise mission-run schools in southern Sudan in 1957 has been interpreted as 
proof of its religious intolerance and desire to Arabise and Islamise the southerners by force. 
However, it was nationalist and legalistic arguments – not religious – that were used to take 
over the mission schools and get rid of the missionaries: they were portrayed as foreign 
agents undermining the government and instigating rebellion and disunity in the south. 59 
Regardless of the quality and cost-effectiveness of the missionary-based education system its 
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very existence was an affront to the whole idea of an independent nation. Nonetheless 
politicians and government officials in Khartoum and in southern Sudan wanted to appear 
tolerant and responsible. It is testimony to the Sudan government’s desire for foreign 
recognition and approval – and its belief in the superiority of legal instruments – that it used 
the formal government apparatus to marginalise and finally to evict the missionaries. Indeed, 
some evidence indicates an element of reluctance among some Northern administrators in the 
south towards implementing the central policy against the missionaries and it appears that 
most decisions regarding the missionaries were deferred to the central government.
60
  
 
The independent government’s education strategy towards the South was focused on 
teaching Islam and Arabic: this was not only a vehicle for spreading a religion and a 
language, but also intended to promote cultural homogeneity and national unity. In 1960, 
Equatoria Governor Ali Baldo issued a lengthy statement on the imposition of Friday as the 
rest day which he ordered DCs to translate and disseminate as widely as possible so that ‘all 
people in the south particularly southerners should know the bare facts’. The statement was 
clearly intended as a public assertion of state sovereignty, couching the issue in terms not of 
religion but of allegiance to the state: 
 
[T]he decision has the legal as well as the moral force of the State. To put it in plain 
and simple language, opposition to the Government decision would mean an 
opposition to the State itself. To this extent this Republic is simply more than 
competent to enforce its will and to see that it is to be obeyed and respected...  
The authors and instigators of the so-called ‘Sunday Protest’ should be reminded that 
even Christ himself orders obedience to the State: Render to God what are God’s and 
to Caeser what are Caeser’s [sic].61 
 
Government officials saw themselves as engaged in educating the southerners in 
citizenship, in how to become a legal subject. It was the duty of the government – ‘to protect 
the interests of the citizens’, to build up the ‘moral force’ of the state, and to prepare the way 
for both development and political participation.62 As elsewhere, such ‘participation’ might 
be compelled or coerced, as part of the education of citizens in their own duties and rights. It 
was not only northern Sudanese administrators who professed to such discourse: the few 
southern administrators participated in it too, such as William Deng Nhial, writing in 1956: 
‘It takes time for a Country like the Sudan to make the Local people understand the 
machinery of Local Government and make them active participants in its economic, social 
and democratic developments’ [emphasis added].63 In 1960, he wrote again to Governor Ali 
15 
 
Baldo, supporting the unity of the Sudan and asserting that ‘we still have a long way to go in 
educating our people in citizenship’.64 Other southern politicians and administrators similarly 
promoted modernisation and development, and urged the people to be ‘good citizens’.65 
 
Governor Ali Baldo occupied a dominant position in Equatoria and in southern Sudan 
more widely in these years, and has often been vilified in the southern Sudanese scholarship 
as emblematic of northern tyranny.
66
 But government documents reveal the extent to which 
he sought to express, explain and justify the authoritarianism of government to other 
administrators, and his concern to assert government legitimacy and prestige to both southern 
and international audiences. He thus epitomises the legalistic and developmentalist discourse, 
as well as the authoritarianism of government in this period. For example following the 
discovery in early 1958 of a possible ‘vicious conspiracy which aims at realizing the Federal 
Status through the incitement of the public and the use of violence’, he lectured his DCs on 
the notion of the citizen as legal subject: 
 
It is our duty Northerners and Southerners to preserve peace and order and to apply 
the law of the State with precision and accuracy and we have to be prepared for every 
eventuality and make sacrifice in the realization of this object. We should therefore 
take all legal precautions to prevent a breach of the peace... but in the same time this 
should not divert us from pursuing our friendly relations with the people to gain their 
full confidence and to serve them and do for their good. ... We will continue to respect 
and serve the people so long as they behave themselves and obey law and order but as 
soon as they try to go out of that orbit by adopting another course we shall have 
nothing but to take the most drastic measures against them. 
 
Ali Baldo’s governorship of Equatoria bridged the period before and after the elections and 
military coup of 1958. The military government of General Abboud is generally seen to have 
accelerated harsh repression and policies of Islamisation in the southern provinces, but some 
scholars have also noted a more gradual hardening of government policies and method across 
the period between 1956 and the early 1960s.
67
 The correspondence and reports by Baldo and 
other administrators reflect this overall continuity of discourse to justify increasingly 
repressive measures.  
 
Ali Baldo is also significant for his explicit engagement with the wider statism and 
governmentality of the period. In 1960, he sent the DCs an extract from a speech on Congo 
by the UN Secretary General, which declared that 
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to lead and govern is not a privilege to be sought but a burden of responsibility to be 
assumed... We have had to act as responsible human brings facing a desperate 
emergency. You try to save a drowning man without prior authorization and even if 
he resists you; you do not let him go even when he tries to strangle you. 
 
He clearly found this metaphor particularly apposite: 
 
[T]his extract had struck me as a genuine and true representation of the new 
conception of the art of Governing which each of us should bear in mind if we are to 
succeed in serving our Country well. Our particular role here in the South demands 
from us a more strict adherence to such theories which we should not only conceive 
but must make the people feel that we are being guided by them.
68
 
 
Again the continuities from the British colonial rhetoric of duty and responsibility are very 
much evident even in this endorsement of a ‘new conception of the art of governing’, 
together with the sense that wider theories and ideologies could add legitimacy to the 
Sudanese administrators’ efforts to save the southerners from drowning in their colonially-
entrenched backwardness. Although seldom as lofty as Ali Baldo, this mentality is reflected 
in much of the contemporary official correspondence of both northern and southern officials.  
 
 
Linking development with law, order and the goal of national unity  
The Torit Mutiny and its aftermath contributed to linking notions of development and 
modernisation with security and law in southern Sudan. The lack of development was 
presented as the explanation for violence: security broke down because ‘the people are poor 
and ignorant and can be mislead [sic] by anybody’.69 In 1956, at the first meeting of the 
Equatoria Province Council after the August 1955 violence, Ali Baldo stressed the 
interdependence of security and development, and the continuing need to increase 
productivity, move people into villages and register land: 
 
We are all convinced that this backward part of the country requires much effort for 
its progress and development, but there could be no development without law, order, 
confidence and time under the guidance of skilled personnel. The urgent necessity for 
the creation of local capital by local effort must be the prime duty of everyone of us 
[original emphasis]. This is the only way or means for expansion within the economic 
frame work or advance in any social legislation. We must produce more than we 
consume. ... The success and failure of such schemes depends on the full cooperation 
and confidence between the administration and the producers.
70
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In the same meeting, the commander of the army in the south, Miralai Ahmed Bey Abu Bakr, 
reinforced the message: 
 
The country’s development schemes, whether Educational, Agricultural, Industrial or 
Commercial, depend entirely upon public security. It would be beyond impossible for 
any individual or community to carry out their duties satisfactorily if the security is 
endangered. 
 
When one of the chiefs who made up the council emphasised that development and increased 
productivity depended on access to capital, he was again reminded by the Governor that 
‘Capital whether local or foreign needs security first’.71 
 
Development and modernisation was firmly predicated on notions of security and law 
and order. ‘Backwardness’ also served as a justification for coercive policing and state 
violence. The British and Condominium policies were blamed for the southerners’ lack of 
development, yet the independent government’s use of coercion and collective punishment 
were rooted in colonial practises and ideology, much as in other parts of Africa.
72
 Moreover, 
as seen above, the Sudanese administration relied on the chiefs and structures of the colonial 
‘Native Administration’ as the primary means of obtaining intelligence and enforcing law and 
order. Paradoxically then, development and modernisation – and the reversal of colonial 
neglect – were to be achieved by colonial governance ideology and by bolstering the 
authority of the agents of colonial rule to maintain security. The independent government’s 
investments and initiatives in sectors related to social and economic development were 
believed to also contribute towards a national developmentalist and cultural integration 
agenda. Economic development in southern Sudan was almost exclusively promoted through 
the development of plantations and cash-crop cultivation, with initiatives including an 
agricultural research station in Yambio, forestry and saw mills in Torit, a rice scheme in 
Aweil and the growing of tobacco in Maridi.
73
 Extension of the rail network to Aweil and 
Wau was first and foremost a measure to increase government control, but was also intended 
to have development impact.  
 
Prison labour was presented as a vehicle for generation of government revenue and 
development of the economy. Extensive use of prison labour, as a part of a more general 
system of forced labour, was a colonial legacy. The Condominium had used prison labour as 
well as forced seasonal labour organised through the chiefs to maintain roads and other 
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government infrastructure projects. The independent government similarly demanded labour 
but paid the labourer at a (low) fixed rate. It also relied on prison labour. In 1958, Ali Baldo 
urged DCs to double the areas under cultivation in their districts and the prison authorities 
were seen as an element in this strategy. In the meeting, the Senior Controller of Prisons 
 
made a full account of what the Prison Camps are doing mentioning some of the their 
achievements, the most important of which is the Lafon Scheme, which will be started 
this year by an area of 500 feddans to be put under Dura cultivation. He said at the 
moment he has 100 prisoners working in this plantation and will as a matter of fact 
need 150 more to be supplied from Districts to cope with this seasons until the 
Scheme is mechanised next year.74  
 
Moreover, prison labour was an opportunity to shape southerners into producers of cash 
crops. This was perceived as a way to expand the monetary economy, but also as a remedy 
against the perceived ‘laziness’ and ‘idleness’ of southerners.75 This report from Bahr el-
Ghazal illustrates this policy and perception of southerners: 
 
It is worth mentioning here that among the many schemes of the prison department in 
this province, durra [sorghum] is given top attention, not only because it increases 
prison revenue, but that its cultivation acquaints the prisoners with the job, which 
most of them might have not been able to do, during their free life or, which they 
regarded as tiresome and non productive [sic], Durra Plantations are also set up in 
villages to enable the natives of those villages to see their relative prisoners do the 
work, with the simple tools which they are unable to work with and to witness the 
prison products of the soil, which many of them regard, as being unsuitable for 
cultivation. It is hoped that with the prison example, people will increase their efforts 
to produce enough for their consumption and their needs.76 
 
The penal system was thus tied not only to the establishment of the security that was seen to 
be so necessary for development, but also to the demonstration of what state-coerced 
development could achieve.  
 
Conclusion 
In southern Sudan, the Torit Mutiny and its aftermath contributed to an intensification 
of state authoritarianism, with Sudanese administrators prepared to use coercion to engender 
‘participation’ and development. Such governance discourses and their accompanying 
ideologies mediate between structures and agency in the sense that they delimitated the 
boundaries of the possible and channelled the attention and initiative of the government 
officials. But, even more importantly, these discourses were deeply embedded in the 
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institutions of government and transcended not only the individual administrator, but also 
changes of regime. Thus, it is possible to see long-term continuities in these authoritarian 
visions of development, modernity and citizenship among later southern administrators as 
well as their northern Sudanese and British predecessors: this was epitomised in the 1970s by 
the President of the High Executive Council of Southern Sudan, Abel Alier’s much-quoted 
declaration ‘If we have to drive our people to paradise with sticks we will do so for their own 
good’.77 But in the political context of the late 1950s, these agendas among the Sudanese 
state elite were interpreted by many southerners as a project to exclude or repress rather than 
to include and improve.  
 
By using the language of the law and the coercive apparatus of state law enforcement 
(including the Native Administration structures) to delineate citizenship and to promote 
development, the Sudanese administrators only made starker the exclusionary and repressive 
aspects of their statism and nationalism. The government discourses analysed in this article 
were thus significant not merely as self-justificatory rhetoric or self-motivating ideology, but 
for their role in setting the terms of political debate. As southern resistance intensified during 
the 1960s, opposition groups appropriated government representatives’ own legalistic 
discourse to criticise the latter’s ‘suppression’ ‘forced assimilation’ and ‘domination’.78 And 
as such resistance was criminalised by government, those who found themselves outside the 
law – and hence denied rights of citizenship – were forced into political exile or armed 
rebellion.
79
 The justification of state violence fed the rhetoric of violent opposition that would 
ultimately escalate into civil war from 1963.  
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